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Abstract
This paper reviews the ethical tensions and the dual loyalty conflict between following military
orders and professional codes of conduct. All competent patients have a right to refuse medical
treatment. However, maintaining confidentiality is not an absolute right. In the military, a doctor
may have a dual loyalty conflict between obeying military orders and following professional
codes of practice. This can become exacerbated when a doctor in a military environment does not
consider all the parties’ interests. This paper suggests that dual loyalty conflict in military
healthcare practice in this environment is best managed via a discretionary ethic-role. This then
allows independent clinical judgment while at the same time minimizing ethical dilemmas, harm,
and conflict to a third party such as a military commander.
KEYWORDS: military healthcare; confidentiality; refusal of treatment; dual loyalty conflict;
PTSD
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Using an Ethical Model to Manage Patient-Soldier Confidentiality When Medical
Treatment for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is Refused
In healthcare, dual loyalty occurs where the clinical role conflicts between the
personal interest of the patient and the duty to another such as an employer (Williams,
2009b). As mentioned by Benetar and Upshur (2008), “moral obligations are beyond those
incumbent on many other members of society” especially Military Healthcare Professionals
(MHCPs). Therefore, for the MHCP, these simultaneous obligations create inevitable ethical
tensions and conflict (Rascona, 2007; International Dual Loyalty Working Group, 2002). On
occasions, they also cause professional compromise, as they need to balance the conflict
between patient care and obeying military orders (London, Rubenstein, Baldwin-Reagaven,
& Van Es, 2006). For example, in the British Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
states that medical treatment must be within the “constraints of Armed Forces medical
policy” and medical needs must be subjected to “military and professional constraints”
(Ministry of Defence, 2007, paragraph 1A6, p. 1A2). This, therefore, emphasises a need for a
MHCP to balance the medical needs of his patient with his military duty (Clark, 2006). It
also limits how a MHCP can practise his healthcare profession in the military. Contrarily, the
MoD also states that it recognises that “medical judgment and ethics” cannot be ignored and
compromised (Ministry of Defence, 2007, paragraph 1A6, p. 1A2). Although not a military
document, this view is shared by the International Dual Loyalty Working Group (London, et
al, 2006), which summarised that the “overruling identity and priority” of a MHCP should be
“that of a health professional” as the patient’s clinical needs are sacrosanct (Annas, 2008, p.
1087).
This paper presents a vignette to consider the ethical tensions and the dual loyalty
conflict between following military orders and professional codes of conduct, concerning
medical confidentiality of a competent patient-soldier refusing medical treatment in a non-
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operational environment. In the context of a vignette, this paper suggests that dual loyalty
conflict in military healthcare practice in a non-operational environment is best managed via
a discretionary ethic-role (Howe, 2003). This, then, allows independent clinical judgment
while at the same time minimizing ethical dilemmas, harm, and conflict to a third party such
as a military commander (Williams, 2009a). By reference to the vignette, that places the law
in the context of a military non-operational environment with a patient suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (Hughes & Huby, 2002; Williams, 2009a). This paper also
explains the English law relating to refusal of medical treatment and patient confidentiality.
Vignette
Sergeant Green, a serving Non-Commissioned Officer in the Coldstream Guards, has
been in the army for twenty years. He has experienced numerous operational deployments,
having served in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Iraq, and, more recently, Afghanistan. In his
last operational tour eighteen months ago, he witnessed several of his comrades being killed
and maimed by local insurgents during firefights or localised small battles. His military
General Practitioner, Major Smith (a senior officer) has just recently diagnosed him with Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychological disorder, in response to severe traumatic
experiences. Major Smith recommends that Sergeant Green immediately start treatment to
overcome this psychological illness with a military Clinical Psychologist. Sergeant Green is
otherwise a fit, healthy, and competent adult.
As Sergeant Green is due to return to Afghanistan in six-weeks’ time for a six-month
tour, he refuses Major Smith’s offer of treatment. He is worried about his future career in the
army since, if he starts treatment, he will not be able to deploy back to Afghanistan with his
comrades and is unlikely to be promoted to the next rank. For the same reasons, Sergeant
Green will not give Major Smith his consent to disclose his psychological illness to his
Commanding Officer (CO), a lieutenant-colonel (a higher ranking senior officer than a
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major). Major Smith, however, has a military obligation to inform Sergeant Green’s CO that
he is currently unfit to deploy. However, as it will leave the CO without an experienced
soldier on the operational tour, it is inevitable that the CO will want to know the exact
reasons why Sergeant Green cannot deploy.
In Major Smith’s medical opinion, Sergeant Green is not currently medically fit to
return to Afghanistan, but with his refusal to accept treatment and without his consent to
disclose his illness to his CO, Major Smith is uncertain what to do. He has a professional
duty to maintain Sergeant Green’s confidentiality, but also a military obligation to follow
military orders in only allowing soldiers to deploy on operations if they are medically fit. He
is also concerned the CO, as a higher-ranking officer, will demand to know the reason why
Sergeant Green cannot deploy. Major Smith is, therefore, concerned about possibly
breaching Sergeant Green’s confidentiality.
By using this vignette this paper considers the following:
1. Does Sergeant Green have the right to refuse medical treatment?
2. What is the duty of confidence expected by Major Smith to Sergeant Green in a nonoperational environment?
3. Does Major Smith have a legal and ethical responsibility to inform the CO of
Sergeant Green’s psychological illness?
4. When there is a dual loyalty conflict between either following professional codes of
conduct or military orders concerning a patient suffering from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, what is the best solution and what is the most appropriate way to deal with
this problem?
Discussion
Although not an absolute duty, the duty to safeguard medical confidentiality arises
from the ethical principle of beneficence (Plambeck, 2002).

However, despite soldiers
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subverting many of their rights in the military such as freedom of expression and speech, it
remains questionable if soldiers should also subvert their healthcare rights and MHCPs
should undermine their own professional autonomy (Visser, 2003). British service personnel
are subjected to the domestic law of the country they are serving in and British military law.
This is so that British service personnel are treated fairly and consistently wherever they are
serving in the world (Ministry of Defence, 2007, paragraph 110). Therefore, in consideration
of whether Sergeant Green could refuse the offer of medical treatment, guidance can be
sought from Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914,
paragraph 126) when he famously stated that a competent adult has a right “to determine
what shall be done with his own body.” Furthermore, in English law, unless declared
otherwise by a medical practitioner and as long as the patient is of “sound mind,” a
competent adult is presumed to have the capacity to consent and refuse medical treatment
(Mental Capacity Act, 2005). This is even if that decision is considered as eccentric and the
patient could die (GMC, 2011). Moreover, in Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) (1994), the
court determined that even if a patient has a mental or psychological illness and decides to
refuse medical treatment, it does not automatically call into question the patient’s capacity to
make his own decisions. The General Medical Council’s (GMC) Consent Guidance (2008)
further outlines the presumption of capacity. Therefore, in following the law, it appears that
Sergeant Green is able to refuse medical treatment for his PTSD. Being in the military and
having a psychological illness does not prevent Sergeant Green from making his own
decisions regarding acceptance of medical treatment (Mental Health Act, 1983; Mental
Health Act, 2007; General Medical Council (GMC, 2008a, p. 27).
The practical significance of being able to refuse treatment is that it enables a patient
to have trust and confidence in their healthcare practitioner (Dimond, 2003). It also helps to
maintain a successful professional relationship (GMC, 2008a). In further consideration of
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whether if it is right for Major Smith to allow Sergeant Green to refuse medical treatment, the
World Medical Association’s (WMA) Declaration of Geneva (1948) stated, “the health of my
patient will be my first consideration. I will not use my medical knowledge to violate human
rights and civil liberties, even under threat.” Moreover, the WMA International Code of
Medical Ethics stated, “A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical
service in full professional and moral independence with compassion and respect for human
dignity” (1949). Accordingly, in adhering to the law and ethical principles, Major Smith
must allow Sergeant Green as a competent adult to refuse medical treatment (GMC, 2011).
The difficulty for Major Smith in Sergeant Green refusing medical treatment,
however, is that in the context of the vignette, it is intrinsically linked into whether Major
Smith should respect Sergeant Green’s confidentiality (Carey, 2009). As such, Major Smith
should warn Sergeant Green about the consequences of refusing to consent to treatment
(GMC, 2009). The legal basis for protecting confidential information was examined in
Campbell v MGN Limited (2004). This case considered the necessity to balance the right for
confidential information to be protected with the right of freedom of expression as the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) protected both
rights (Nursing Midwifery Council, 2009). Article 8 of the ECHR protects confidential
information whereas Article 10 of the ECHR protects freedom of expression. In Campbell v
MGN (2004, paragraph 1012), Lord Hoffman concluded that “… [B]oth reflect important
civilised values, but, as often happens, neither can be given effect in full measure without
restricting the other…”

Protecting a patient’s medical data is also important as was

emphasised from the case of MS v Sweden (1999, paragraph 41) where the court stated that
“respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle” so as to “preserve his or her
confidence in the medical profession and in the health service in general.”

Online Journal of Health Ethics Vol 7, No 2, November 2011

PATIENT-SOLDIER CONFIDENTIALITY

7

An additional difficulty for Major Smith is that confidentiality may have to override
other considerations that a doctor may have. This is because although Sergeant Green must
be Major Smith’s first concern before any other consideration (GMC, 2006; Nursing
Midwifery Council, 2008), Major Smith also has a military duty to follow military orders in
only allowing fit soldiers to deploy. In the interest of the military, informing the CO of the
soldier’s condition may override that of maintaining the patient’s confidentiality.

With

Sergeant Green refusing medical treatment, however, it makes it difficult for Major Smith to
justify without breaching confidentiality to the CO the reason why this soldier cannot deploy.
The CO as a senior officer may order Major Smith to tell him why Sergeant Green cannot
deploy. Following military orders and adhering to military discipline is the “backbone that
promotes efficiency in the Armed Forces” (Soldier Management, 2004). Murray (Cramer,
1921, p. 774) describes following military orders as, “…the long-continued habit by which
the very muscles of the soldier instinctively obeys the command; even if his mind is too
confused to attend, yet his muscles will obey.” However, although military orders and
discipline are evidently necessary, in the context of the vignette they become an almost
physical impediment for Major Smith in deciding what course of action to take. This is
because although confidentiality is a professional core value, it appears to be in conflict with
the military core value of obeying orders (Kipnis, 2006).
Solving ethical problems is easier than attempting to solve an ethical dilemma where
one party is likely to be aggrieved of the decision that is made (Tschudin, 1992). When there
is a conflict in determining the correct action, ethical problems should be divided between
ethical dilemmas and tests of integrity (Coleman, 2009). There are several options to choose
from when faced with an ethical dilemma and a person can, therefore, have difficulty in
deciding what the correct option is to take. With a test of integrity, however, it is obvious
what the correct option is to take since the distinction between bad options and good options
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is clear. A more exact way of dealing with a situation when there is dual loyalty conflict
between following professionals codes and military orders is given by Edmund Howe (2003).
Edmund Howe’s (2003) model enables a logical discussion and subsequent analysis of
military medical dilemmas in diverse military environments. This model allows a more
precise concept of professional-military conflicts by arguing that MHCPs are governed by
three role-specific ethics, which involves the person following each role strictly. These
consist of (i) a medical role-specific ethic, (ii) a military role-specific ethic and (iii) a
discretionary role-specific ethic. Howe (2003, pp. 333-334) suggests that with a medical
role-specific ethic, MHCPs would follow professional codes of practice and put their patients
first. With a military role-specific ethic, MHCPs would follow military orders above
everything else (Howe, 2003, pp. 333-334). Finally, the third role is where the MHCP uses
some discretion in deciding when and whether the needs of the military are absolute (Howe,
2003, p. 335). Using Howe’s three-dimensional model, Major Smith is faced with three
options.
Option 1
With a medical role-specific ethic, Major Smith would follow professional codes of
practice and legal obligations and would make Sergeant Green as his patient, his first concern
(Howe, 2003; GMC, 2006). He would give him his undivided attention (Rubenstien, 2003).
He would also respect Sergeant Green’s confidentiality. Patient confidentiality arose from
the Hippocratic Oath in the 4th century BC and is now enshrined in the Declaration of Geneva
where it states a physician will “respect the secrets which are confided in me, even after the
patient has died” (WMA, 1948). The General Medical Council (2009, p. 6) also states,
“confidentiality is central to trust between doctors and patients” and that those patients have a
right for their confidential medical information to be respected. This further emphasises that
there must be trust and an understanding about what passes between the doctor and the
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patient. The Nurse Midwifery Council (2009) also emphasises the importance of maintaining
patient confidentiality for a trustful relationship between healthcare practitioner and patient.
The difficulty, however, in following a medical role-specific ethic is that although
Major Smith would be practising clinical independence (Williams, 2009a), it would increase
the tensions of the dual loyalty conflict. This is because Major Smith would not consider
breaching Sergeant Green’s confidentiality to the CO as professional obligations would
clearly make his patient his sole concern (GMC, 2009). In contrast, the duty to follow and
obey military orders would undoubtedly conflict with this position (Howe, 2003). In such
circumstances when following professional obligations, Major Smith would be taking an
absolutist approach, as he would consider that his professional responsibility to Sergeant
Green is his first and only concern above everything else (Ministry of Defence, 2007).
Wolfendale (2009) would consider this action a mark of professional integrity and not
military insubordination. Equally, Kipnis (2006) would assert that absolute confidentiality
without any disclosure to a third party is the only way to solely respect a patient’s medical
privacy.
However, although Major Smith’s actions would demonstrate that confidentiality and
privacy is necessary to maintain patient and professional autonomy irrespective of the
environment, this approach is effectively saying that he does not consider the military
consequences of his actions. His actions may be perceived as military insubordination as he
would fail to inform Sergeant Green’s CO as to why he cannot deploy. Consequently, Major
Smith may be acting legally and ethically in one sense in upholding Sergeant Green’s
confidentiality. But, militarily he would be compromising legality and acting unethically by
not informing the CO (Yeo, 1989). In addition, by taking a medical role-specific ethic, it is
also unlikely that he would allow Sergeant Green to deploy because irrespective of respecting
his confidentiality, this soldier would still be medically unfit to deploy on an operational tour.
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Option 2
In contrast, to a medical ethical approach, Major Smith may decide to follow a
military role-specific ethic and believe that MHCPs should follow military orders above
everything else (Ministry of Defence, 2007).

With this approach, Sergeant Green’s

healthcare needs, and his confidentiality become secondary to the military need, which is to
follow military orders. This may seem unethical to a civilian doctor, but in the military,
while a doctor has the same degree of legal and ethical responsibility to his patients, these
problems are often more complex and there may be circumstances that necessitate placing the
military interest above the patient’s interest (Benetar & Upshur, 2008). For example, to
disclose medical information to another person to prevent an ill soldier from deploying on
operational tour or within a battlefield may seem to be a reasonable action to a military
doctor.
It is, therefore, clear that preserving patient confidentiality in the military is
problematic. Rogers (2006) argues that preserving confidentiality in any situation is complex
since sharing information to treat and protect the patient and others from harm, often results
in the widespread disclosure of personal information. Maintaining confidentiality becomes
more challenging in the military since a caveat of a soldier voluntarily joining this type of
disciplined organisation is that are aware that they will lose some of their personal autonomy
in doing so (Visser, 2003). Thus, achieving medical confidentiality can be flawed from the
first time a patient seeks medical treatment since he or she has already made a conscious
decision to reveal his or her problem to the physician (Kipnis, 2006). Accordingly, Major
Smith’s actions in disclosing Sergeant Smith’s PTSD to his CO may seem to be a reasonable
action and justifiable. This is because Sergeant Smith is planning to deploy on his forthcoming operational tour, which in itself could be problematic and may cause harm to his
colleagues if his symptoms were exacerbated (The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2010).
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Therefore, with a military role-specific ethic, Major Smith would breach Sergeant’s
confidentiality and inform his CO of the medical reasons why this soldier cannot deploy.
Contrarily, it is accepted that this position is in contrast to the principles of maintaining
patient confidentiality and may be seen as morally repugnant to other civilian healthcare
professionals (Crowe & Hardil, 1991). Professionally, such a disclosure may also be seen as
an unjustified breach of confidentiality and would ordinarily in a civilian environment almost
certainly lead to fitness to practise proceedings (GMC, 2009).
Option 3
It is perhaps obvious then that there is no clear-cut way to deal with the problem that
Major Smith is faced with regarding patient confidentiality. Ethical dilemmas concerning
patient confidentiality are complex (Beech, 2007). In contrast to the medical and military
role-specific ethical approaches, it appears that the best approach would be for Major Smith
to use a discretionary role-ethic. This role would allow Major Smith to carefully consider
and determine when and whether the needs of the military are absolute (Howe, 2003 pp. 333334). This role is unlikely to be appropriate in a combat situation because military doctors
are not military tacticians and they lack the military skills and knowledge to make the best
choice where these choices are more complicated and decisions have to be made quickly
(Howe, 2003 pp. 333-334). However, during peacetime, ethical challenges are less pressing
(Simmons & Rycraft, 2010).

Major Smith would also be making a decision in an

environment that is safer and more familiar to him than that of a combat situation (Simmons
& Rycraft, 2010). Therefore, using a discretionary role-ethic, Major Smith would still not
allow Sergeant Green to deploy. Unlike the military role-specific ethic, where Sergeant
Green’s clinical needs appear secondary to the military need not to allow an unfit soldier to
deploy, Major Smith would however, still disclose Sergeant Green’s PTSD to his CO. This
however, would be for medical reasons in the interests of the patient and not military reasons.
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Major Smith would still be following a universal principle in that professional responsibility
overrides all other considerations (Benetar & Upshur, 2008).
While it might remain unacceptable to Sergeant Green for Major Smith to disclose his
PTSD to his CO, using a discretionary role-ethic has three advantages:
First, while professional responsibility suggests that Major Smith is disclosing
confidential information because he is accountable to the GMC and could face professional
consequences if he did not disclose this information when it is in the public interest to do so
(Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 1976); however, his actions appear to be
reasonable as he is also being caring to Sergeant Green by making him his first concern
(GMC, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, his actions are allowing for the principles of patient and
professional autonomy to be respected (Seedhouse, 2001). Moreover, he is being beneficent
to his patient, which is the core of medical confidentiality (Plambeck, 2002) and nonmaleficent to the CO as a third party (Williams, 2009). He is also placing accountability and
responsibility to Sergeant Green’s healthcare needs above all other considerations, which is
more legitimate and ethical than following the orders of a powerful military individual such
as a CO (Benatar & Upshur, 2008).
Thus, despite Sergeant Green refusing the offer of medical treatment from a clinical
psychologist, Major Smith’s actions are justified because it is unlikely that Sergeant Green’s
symptoms of PTSD will improve without treatment (NHS National Institute for Clinical
Excellence, 2005). Furthermore, if deployed on an operational tour where his life and others
could be at risk from enemy attacks, these symptoms may be exacerbated, which in turn
could potentially be harmful to himself and others if put under added stress (Sayer,
Friedmann-Sanchez, Spoont, Murdoch, Parker, Chiros, & Rosenheck,, 2009; Feczer &
Bjorklund, 2009).

Moreover, it is more difficult to remove a soldier suffering from

psychological trauma symptoms once deployed on an operational tour because liaising with
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the soldier’s CO to have him sent back home becomes more challenging (Simmons &
Rycraft, 2010).

This is because a CO has many priorities and needs all the available

manpower he can gather together in the field and the evacuation of a soldier from the
frontline severely depletes manpower since it takes a fit soldier to remove an injured one
(Gross, 2006).

This, therefore, further emphasizes the need for MHCPs to disclose

information before deployment when a patient’s and other people’s lives could be at risk
from harm (Castledine, 2010). Thus, in reaching this decision, Major Smith would have
balanced the advantages and disadvantages of divulging Sergeant Green’s condition to his
CO with the “level of risk at hand” (Gibson, 2006).
Secondly, confidentiality is not an absolute right and disclosure of confidential
information without consent in the public interest is lawful in certain circumstances such as
misconduct, illegality and gross immorality (Nurse Midwifery Council, 2009). This was
explained in W v Egdell (1990), where the court determined that confidentiality could be
breached when it is justifiable to do so as if there is the threat of serious harm to others.
However, such a disclosure must only be made to the person it was intended for and not to
anyone else. Thus, Major Smith should only inform Sergeant Green’s CO and no one else
that Sergeant Green is unfit to deploy due to PTSD. In addition, Major Smith should inform
Sergeant Green that he is disclosing the information to his CO in relation to a public interest
and that his reasons for disclosure will be documented in his notes (GMC, 2009).
The duty of confidence is thus a qualified right meaning that in certain circumstances,
the law may permit Major Smith to disclose personal information about Sergeant Green if it
is in the public interest to do so (McHale, 2009). For example, the GMC states personal
information of a patient can be disclosed to a third party if the “benefits to an individual or to
society of the disclosure outweigh both the public and the patient’s interest in keeping the
information confidential” (GMC, 2009, p. 16). Thus, it may be reasonable to Major Smith
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that disclosing Sergeant Green’s confidentiality to his CO to prevent his deployment is
justifiable. This is because it would be illegal for him as a doctor to knowingly allow a
soldier to deploy on a dangerous operational tour when he is medically unfit to do so
(Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 1976).
Thirdly, by Major Smith explaining to the CO the reasons why Sergeant Green
cannot deploy, it minimises further potential harm to Sergeant Green if his symptoms
exacerbate in a harsh environment where medical expertise from a clinical psychologist is
less likely to be available (Simmons & Rycraft, 2010). While this may be unacceptable to
Sergeant Green, healthcare professionals should do everything they can to protect their
patients from further harm (Williams, 2009a). In addition, by Major Smith being open and
transparent to the CO in giving him the medical reasons why Sergeant Green cannot deploy,
it makes the ethical dilemma seem less problematic for Major Smith. This is because it also
manages the dual loyalty conflict between either following military orders or professional
codes of practice more smoothly rather than creating further tension in not giving any
explanation to the CO (Annas, 2008). Additionally, although Sergeant Green will not deploy
and the CO’s manpower will be depleted, the CO’s interests will be met since it will prevent
a psychologically unfit soldier to embark on a dangerous operational tour (Benetar & Upshur,
2008). Further, at the same time as advocating Sergeant Green’s medical needs, Major Smith
is also effectively communicating to the CO to avoid any negative interaction between the
parties that dual loyalty can sometimes create without dialogue (Williams, 2009a). It thus
prevents any undue influence from the CO as a more senior officer possibly ordering Major
Smith to divulge personal information about Sergeant Green (Wynia, 2007). Moreover,
Major Smith’s actions will take into account the common interests that the CO and the Major
share in allowing only fit soldiers to deploy. A view shared by Pettrey (2003) who suggests
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that identification of needs and recognising common interests will minimise potential conflict
between parties where there is a dual loyalty conflict.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the duty of confidentiality is grounded in law and medical ethics
(Plambeck, 2002). This paper has highlighted the complex nature of maintaining patient
confidentiality in a military environment especially where a patient refuses to consent to
medical treatment and where his personal information is divulged to a third person. This
paper has also highlighted the difficulties for military doctors when they have a dual loyalty
conflict between obeying military orders and following professional codes of practice
(Benetar & Upshur, 2008).

When having to follow professional codes of conduct and

military orders, this role is problematic as they can be acting ethically and legally in one
sense but unethically and illegally in another (Yeo, 1989). Thus, the management of military
dual loyalty is challenging and can be contradictory to the values and beliefs of normal
civilian ethical principles (Griffiths & Jasper, 2007).
Using Howe’s (2003) three-dimensional role-specific model, this paper has concluded
that managing patient-soldier confidential information when the soldier is suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder is complex and demanding. It has also concluded that to avoid
further harm to a patient and an exacerbation of dual loyalty conflict in a non-operational
environment (Coleman, 2009), the most appropriate method is to make the patient the first
concern of the military doctor. Also, the doctor should have an awareness and appreciation
that takes into consideration the interests of the third party (Williams, 2009a). For military
soldiers, although they subvert some of their rights and freedoms when they join the military
(Howe, 2003), they are still entitled to be treated with respect and have their private medical
information kept confidential when appropriate. However, this paper has concluded that in
the context of the vignette, disclosure of confidential information about a soldier without his
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consent to his CO to prevent the soldier from deploying on an operational tour is both lawful
and ethical when in the interests of the public (Visser, 2003).

Please note that the opinions expressed by the author represent those of the author and do not
reflect the opinions of the Online Journal of Health Ethics’ editorial staff, editors or
reviewers.
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